Abstract
Information technology (IT) innovation can be defined as the creation and new organizational application of digital computer and communication technologies. The paper suggests that IT innovation theory needs to be expanded to analyze IT innovations in kind that exhibit atypical discontinuities in ITinnovation behaviors by studying two questions. First, can a model of disruptive IT innovations be created to understand qualitative changes in IT development processes and their outcomes so that they can be related to architectural discontinuities in computing capability? Second, to what extent can the observed turmoil among systems development organizations that has been spawned by Internet computing be understood as a disruptive IT innovation?
To address the first question, a model of disruptive IT innovation is developed. The model defines a disruptive IT innovation as an architectural innovation originating in the information technology base that has subsequent pervasive and radical impacts on development processes and their outcomes. These base innovations establish necessary but not sufficient conditions for subsequent innovation behaviors. To address the second question, the impact of Internet com1Michael Myers was the accepting senior editor for this paper.
2Please note that the authorship order is alphabetical to recognize the equal effort put into this paper by the coauthors.
Introduction
In the mid-1990s, computing entered a state of flux that was triggered by the Internet. To address the observed gaps in Internet computing studies and IT innovation research, this paper engages in a cycle of theory generation and validation that seeks to advance our understanding of the dynamics of IT innovation and specific IT innovation types. We use the generated theory to explore the extent to which Internet computing as a new paradigm has led to disruptive changes (introduced here as being both radical and pervasive) in the services4 that are built, and in the ways those services are built. In brief, the research questions posed are: The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for IS innovation research and practice, and an epilogue that discusses these implications in light of the end of the dot-com boom.
A Model of Disruptive IT Innovation Innovation Defined
A widely accepted definition of organizational innovation is that it involves adoption of an idea, material artifact, or behavior that is new to the organization adopting it (Daft 1978; Rogers and Shoemaker 1971) . Not all ideas, material artifacts, or behaviors adopted are innovations; an innovation must be accompanied with newness or novelty as a key distinguishing feature. Because defining newness is often difficult, it is argued that it is the perception of newness that counts, rather than whether the idea or artifact is new to the world. Following Zaltman et al. (1977) , innovations are always defined in terms of a specific individual, organization, or community.
The innovation literature is voluminous and diverse, but two important streams can be distinguished: (1) theories of industrial innovation and (2) the diffusion of innovation literature. The first stream deals with types of innovations: artifacts and ideas that are new to a community or industry. Industrial innovation research has examined structural characteristics of an industry, product (architecture), market, or organization, and has asked why and how ideas, behaviors, or artifacts that are novel for the industry or community emerge, and what their impacts are (Abernathy and Clark 1985; Christensen 1992a Christensen , 1992b . The diffusion of innovation stream has focused on innovations in scope: the adoption of artifacts and ideas that are new to the would-be adopter once they have been discovered. This research stream has focused on the innovationdemand side, and primarily applied diffusion of innovation theory to discern patterns of diffusion (Rogers 1990 ). Researchers' primary interests have been in discerning factors and processes 4For simplicity, "services" as used herein represent both systems (that cover hardware, software, people, and other artifacts and their relationships that result from systems development), and services (which cover exploitation of those systems in time and space to carry out some organizational tasks or processes). 
IT Innovation Types
We distinguish between three types of IT innovations and their interactions in a model hereafter referred to as the three-set model of IT innovation (see Figure 1) Figure 1 by double headed arrows).
Subcategories of IT Innovation Types
The three innovation sets in Figure 1 can be divided into subgroups, depending on the nature and content of the innovation in each innovation set (Swanson 1994 ). These subgroups are illustrated in more detail in Table 1 Research Conjecture A: Radical IT innovation in Internet computing related development processes: Internet computing will be a necessary (but not sufficient) factor radically affecting system development processes in adopting systems development organizations.
Research Conjecture B: Radical IT innovation in Internet computing related services: Internet computing will be a necessary (but not sufficient) factor radically impacting services developed by adopting systems development organizations.
These conjectures convey the necessary (but not sufficient) relationships between the main constructs of the disruptive IT innovation model and their application to Internet computing.13 The 131t can be speculated that some radical innovations in development processes and services are caused indirectly from radical IT base innovations via the other sets. However, this interaction would not be necessary in order to have a disruptive innovation. As a result, its existence is omitted from the formal conjecture. Evidence for both conjectures can be sought in multiple ways. A first, indirect way is to explore professional texts and literature for evidence of how system development has changed since adopting Internet computing, and trace this change to the adoption of Internet computing. A second, more direct way is to investigate empirically (either through qualitative or quanti-tative means) how system development organizations that have adopted Internet computing have changed their behaviors in relation to generated development processes and delivered services in contrast to those that have not (to establish the necessary condition). Findings must also address directionality so that we can trace the origins of change to characteristics of Internet computing. Findings also need to address pervasiveness in order to show that Internet computing simultaneously influences both IT innovation sets. In other words, when critical features of Internet computing have been adopted, the adoption must be followed by radical innovations in both system development and services. Multiple sources of evidence for all of these findings would provide strong evidence that Internet computing has become a disruptive IT innovation. Tables 3 and 4) . Moreover, we detected a significant number of unforeseen and novel services in the literature that suggest that Internet computing has had a radical impact on new services. Likewise, a large set of new development features and processes including telecommunication design, artistic development, and increased diversity of development tasks indicate that radical changes in system development have taken place since the adoption of Internet computing. The simultaneous impact of Internet computing on system development processes and on services can be inferred from the fact that the demands for new services have consequently created the increased diversity and new tasks within development processes. Overall the analysis of the extant system development literature argues for both the radical and the pervasive impact of Internet computing on services and system development processes as reflected by the sum of items in Tables 3 and 4 .
Innovations in Systems

A Multisite Case Study of Internet Computing as a Disruptive IT Innovation Research Methodology and Sampling
To further validate the two conjectures proposing the disruptive nature of Internet computing, we carried out a theory-driven, rigorous, and confirmatory multisite case study (Yin 1994) in eight system development organizations.15 Four 14We carried out a relatively systematic search of all textbooks that discussed e-business or Internet development. In addition, we searched conference proceedings dealing with systems development and software engineering (e.g., Information Systems Development, European Conference on Information Systems) and analyzed published articles that discuss system development changes during Internet computing. Thanks go to two anonymous reviewers and the associate editor for pointing out additional sources.
15The authors approached the companies with a request of having access to their system development documentation and technology strategies as well as a willingness to share their experiences of using Internet computing. We promised them a summary report of our findings, and a list of "best practices" in these companies. Under these conditions, all contacted companies were willing to openly share their experiences, and discuss and reveal their technology and software development strategies, as long as their anonymity was honored. Interviews with the firms also included reviews of their software portfolios. These reviews showed that organizations extensively exploited innovations in base service capability (ICBase3). For each firm, the majority of the new applications assumed ubiquity of service (ICBase3a) with 24-hour-a-day by 7-day-a-week availability, and a global reach via the Internet. Likewise, seven of the eight firms indicated that they were developing systems that required careful attention to media features (ICBase2c/lCBase3b) in a way that was a radical departure from traditional systems. Likewise, a representative from firm 8 observed that traditional methodologies were too heavy for their current development, which required a "very lightweight" process.
The remaining traditional development firm (firm 2) experienced the least amount of change in development processes. The lack of significantly altered processes could be attributed to the fact that they were traditionally only using abstract ideas and principles and did not historically have rigid methodologies: I will not say [our traditional] methodology goes to a level as deep as an approved state-of-the-art software process would dictate. We are largely relying as well on existing known literature. We have a number of identifiable best practices books and literature on how to do stuff They did, however, recognize significant changes to their prototyping processes and tool use when developing services for Internet computing. So in these two areas where they had a rigid method in earlier development, disruptions were seen.
Beyond changes in development methodologies, most firms saw an unprecedented reliance on the purchase and assembly of software components as a critical part of their software development process (ICSDlc, ICBase2a). The overriding theme among the firms was that a combination of the mature components market (ICBase2a) along with drastically shortened timelines imposed by their customers created this change (or planned change) in how they built software. All firms found that the adoption of Internet computing correlated with expectations of a drastic shortening of software delivery times when compared with traditional system development. In many cases, timelines were shortened by a factor of four or more. In response, seven firms (all but firm 4) were currently buying, or were planning on buying, significantly more components from the external market. As an executive of firm 1 stated:
We always take the fast way out [now in Internet computing]. We have often been able to buy and plug in a component faster than we would have been able to just spec out the requirements alone, let alone build with quality assurance.
Similarly, the executive in firm 5 stated that if there is "a good component that some small company has, there's no sense for us making [it] ourselves." By changing the scope, content, and complexity of firms' development processes, Internet computing had also created the need for the firms to segment their resources into stronger specializations than was required in traditional system development. The nature of development was radically different as it relied upon these increased specializations, and consequently development complexity had increased in an unprecedented fashion. Firms had difficulties coordinating new skill sets and specialized tasks, and they were constantly crafting resources to manage and integrate the work in each specialized area (ICSD2b). Each firm had created dedicated managers in the form of project managers, technical managers, or systems architects, who were responsible for pooling diverse resources and skills together to develop complex Internet services and managing the acquisition of related necessary skills via learning and grafting (c.f. Appendix C).
In consequence, all firms reported that the sheer volume and scope of knowledge that they had to tap into to successfully carry out development had increased dramatically across various specializations (ICSD1a-c, ICSD2a) . Organizations allocated significantly more resources to identify, garner, and absorb knowledge within each IT innovation set covering advances in IT base, software development, and service families and domains. Due to the volume of this change, they argued that their current resources were becoming more inadequate. Interviewees told that the proportion of relevant technical and business knowledge they were exploiting had actually decreased because the knowledge was so different and could not be integrated easily to existing knowledge bases. A manager from firm 2 stated:
Our firm traditionally had extremely good knowledge sharing practices in place... [now we] have just not been able to keep up with technology and the way that technology has been spreading rapidly and diversifying into different subgroups.
As a result firms had less specialized knowledge and skill redundancy for development. In some cases, a single individual held all critical skills. Firm 6, for example, noted that they had one expert for many critical technologies and worse still, they "don't have enough people yet to say that we have very good expertise on every technology we employ. " During the interviews, the firms were specifically asked whether they had garnered specialized resources for each of the four areas identified to be critical in Internet computing in Tables 2 and 3:  telecommunications Experts in each area were regarded to be both valuable and scarce, and they were seen as critical for learning new technologies and their uses, and for transferring this knowledge to the rest of the organization. The architect in firm 2 19The major exception is for firm 4. Firm 4 did recognize that ISD complexity was increasing (ICSD1c) and that they consequently required a careful orchestration of projects (ICSD2b). Likewise, the company also recognized the critical need for deep knowledge in the areas of telecom (ICSD2a), interface (ICSDla), and business processes (ICSD1b). But, unlike other firms, firm 4 did not garner specialized resources. Instead they preferred to maintain their tradition of having overlapping skill sets. Our data set does lend some possible explanation into why the firm behaved differently. The culture in firm 4 had always been one where knowledge sharing was considered a major part of the reward system (often at the expense of competitive salaries) and, therefore, they were resistant to adopt practices that would fragment people into specialized skills. It is also possible that the nature of their business (they provided a niche product and had a near monopoly on a fixed market) allowed them to maintain a broad specialization. They were seeing timelines shorten similar to other firms, but they had more flexibility in their deadlines and did not see the same degree of time pressure. The most radical shift appeared in the area of garnering and exploiting graphical and artistic expertise. In three of the six mature firms (firms 1, 7, and 8), specialized media resources were added onto their existing project structures through outsourcing. Firm 2 built their own expertise through grafting and internal training. Firm 3 recognized the need to have specialized media skills and separated media design tasks from software developers by reassigning these tasks to analysts. They soon discovered, however, that the business analysts were not capable of diligently performing both Internet computing process analysis and media tasks. As a result, during the week prior the interview, the firm had decided to take the media tasks away from the business analysts and hire expert media designers from outside the firm. This decision coincided with grafting expertise in technology integration (ICSDlc) via the hiring in of a new chief technology officer.
Interviewees indicated that the new divisions were caused by Internet computing. Evidence of this was most readily seen when we compared the two startups (5 and 6) with two of the older software firms (3 and 7). The two startups were initiated at the beginning of Internet computing, and both found it necessary very near to their inception to build deeper resources along the four areas of telecommunications, graphics, business process engineering, and software. One of them even designed their skill bases along these four dimensions with nearly these exact terms (see Appendix C). In contrast, the older firms observed that these four specializations were necessary and that they lacked expertise in some of the four areas. As a result, they concluded that they needed some combination of either outsourcing along these areas or rapidly hiring new people to graft skills in these areas. These older firms were slower than the startup firms in adopting the new skill bases as a means to manage their competency portfolio. As a result, these older firms more often depended on external resources either by renting deep expertise or by grafting it onto their existing skill base.
Internet Computing as Disruptive Service Innovation
Both Lyytinen et al. (1998) and Turoff and Hiltz (1998) predicted that a very different concept of services would emerge during Internet computing.20 Our data tells largely the same story and lends strong support for Conjecture B. The companies experienced a profound change in the services being demanded and built, as well as in how their customers viewed these applications. They acknowledged that they were building systems that differed significantly from those that they had built prior to Internet computing. An interviewee in firm 2 clarified the change:
The Web enabled us to connect to legacy systems through a non-legacy interface. So it has changed dramatically what we know already. In addition to that, that's a positive side effect. With the introduction to the Web, [we have learned that] legacy systems...cannot be legacy anymore and they need to interact. Which has forced introduction of XML, etc.... The Web has made it possible [to] share technologies worldwide in a manner and fashion we were not able to do before.
An interviewee in firm 8 characterized the difference as follows:
The Web interface [has to be] more forgiving than...[a] normal client/server application. And the thing that makes it a challenge is to make the user interface 20As stated, however, the types of services created were not specifically identified in these studies. so easy to use and so fast that they really don't have to ask [for] help; they really don't have to push the help button... [because] it might be your grandmother is using it.
The most significant change seen was embodied by the emergence of the two firms in the sample that did not exist prior to 1995. These companies were established specifically to fill unmet demand in software services brought about by Internet computing (and were referred to at the time with terms such as e-Business consultants). Examples of new systems built by these firms included business-to-consumer (B2C) applications that extended existing products from traditional telephone and person-to-person sales channels for a financial company; middleware and front-end applications to link WAP-based B2C; business-tobusiness (B2B) services; and business-toemployee (B2E) intranet solutions with legacy systems (thus demonstrating both radical and pervasive innovation in services).
For the remaining six firms, the types of services they were developing had changed as well. Each company reported significant changes in their system portfolios and across services. Before, they had each been developing either mainframe or client/server based applications. Recently, their customers had started to demand solutions that benefitted from many characteristics of base technology innovations and utilized generic service capabilities of ubiquity (ICBase3a), and media orientation (ICBase3b).
In sum, the services being built by the eight firms were typically Internet computing applications that had browser interfaces (public B2C Web systems, B2B extranet applications, and B2E intranet services). While two firms did not develop services in each ICS1-4 area (firms 3 and 4 were making services for a single parent company and were involved in only B2C and B2B applications), the remaining six firms did develop services consistent with each type of service (ICSla-ICS4a). Collectively, these services span all IT innovation types outlined in Table 4 . Examples of some specific services developed in each area by the firms are listed in Table 5 .
The firms noted that these innovations would not have been possible with earlier computing capability, thus demonstrating a radical departure in services delivered and the weak form of causality suggested by our Conjecture B. None of their clients had previously requested systems for such a broad range of end users (specifically those that interacted with consumers as end users), for such a large number of concurrent users (scalability), and with expectations of 24-hour-a-day availability and reliability. At the time of the interview these intranet, extranet, or public Web systems were the ones either exclusively or most commonly requested.
The developed services had radically impacted their client organizations. In one case, using the Internet computing software developed by firm 4, a company stopped selling their services at a fixed annual rate and instead became an Application Service Provider (ASP), selling their services by the transaction fees. Becoming an ASP was not possible before a wide adoption of Internet computing. In another case, a company implementing an internal purchasing intranet application from firm 8 saved "somewhere around 200 million U.S. dollars, in one year" in contrast to using their traditional computing systems. The technology manager in firm 8 strongly believed that this system and its benefits were not possible prior to Internet computing and, hence it was a necessary condition for these changes. In a third case, services from firm 5 transformed a lower-tier financial services company into the second largest trading company in the world with "transactions over $2 billion every single day" by creating its Internet presence. Again, this business model was not possible prior to Internet computing and thus represents a radical change. These glimpses support the widespread claims that Internet computing has radically transformed many services and their adopting organizations.21 ICS2a: Unforeseen Intranet (strategic): Web-based balanced scorecard system. Tracks key applications for performance indicators that are considered core to business line of service functional integra-firm. System based on EJB architecture utilizing Java Server pages as a tion front end. One of the advantages of the EJB architecture is that it enables the system to run on most database systems, including but not limited to SQL Server 7 and Oracle 7.x +. Utilizing the Java server pages as a front end enables the application to be completely browser-transparent.
ICS3a: Unforeseen B2C Internet computing applications (strategic): e-Government applications. applications for Services of government were expanded to allow tens of thousands of customer process citizens to concurrently submit documents and request public services over integration the Internet independent of client platform (including mobile service) or the time of day.
ICS4a: Unforeseen B2B Extranet applications (strategic): B2B digital marketplace application for applications for e-procurement in newspaper industry. Application aggregates purchases of interorganizational such items as newsprint and ink across the entire newspaper industry in integration
order to lower transaction fees and prices. System is available 24 hours a day and is independent of location, client, and platform independent.
Discussion and Conclusions
Main Findings
We have tried to address two questions: 
Limitations
The first limitation deals with generalizability of the findings. Because this paper is engaged both in theory generation and validation, we must ask how generalizable the findings are from multiple angles. First, it is not clear to what extent the developed innovation model can be generalized to other theoretical contexts. By drawing upon multiple streams of theory building, we were able to develop an appropriate set of constructs that apply to disruptive IT innovation. Its theoretical generalizability to other types of contexts needs to be more carefully observed in future studies. Second, we applied the model to study the impacts of Internet computing in an early adoption cohort. Due to the nature of our sample, it remains unclear to what extent the findings can be generalized to the entire adopter population. Without further research, we can only faithfully generalize our findings to first movers, or to early adopters in the next disruptive wave (whatever form that takes). In later adoption cohorts, IT innovations related to adopting Internet computing may take different forms, and its adoption may not necessarily trigger similar effects. The radical nature of Internet computing may weaken over time if (and when) Internet computing comes of age, and standardized co-specialized assets of conceiving and developing services emerge. In relation to non-adopters (i.e., the lack of a control group in our study), we can refer to other studies and experiences from our fieldwork, which point out that similar (predicted) changes had not taken place in non-adopter organizations. It is important to reiterate that our sample included organizations that continued to develop non-lnternet computing software in ways that are more traditional. These firms witnessed that processes and outcomes in those traditional parts of their organizations had not been affected similarly to the ways Internet computing had seen change. Hence, we are relatively confident that the circumstances that establish necessary conditions for observed change were faithfully detected. A third issue of generalizability deals with how it can be applied to understand other waves of disruptive IT innovation. Tables 2, 3 , and 4 for Internet computing need to be developed for other disruptive IT technologies.
The second limitation is a product of the organizations studied. Results concerning the radical content and pervasive scope of changes in IT innovations are based on data collected from organizations that develop services, not from those that adopt and exploit them. Due to the confidentiality restrictions we could not expand the data collection to organizations adopting services. This task remains an untapped research challenge where the observations concerning the disruptive nature of IT innovation are collected from multiple sources covering both developing and utilizing organizations.
The third limitation involves the possibility that our data collection method may bring both a selection and timing bias concerning the disruptive nature of Internet computing. Assessments of the radical nature of a specific technology are always sensemaking exercises that are bound to the specific context, and the selection of evaluators within that context. In our case, we interviewed early adopters of Internet computing who operated under strong incentives that related to the success of these technologies. Usually, in situations like this, the pushers of technology overestimate its originality and impact.23 The same holds true when collecting data about historical epochs where the technology has become fashionable. Finally, the interviews were carried out at the peak of the e-business fever characterized by hypercompetition, abundant financial resources, and fast-paced market change. Hence, using promoters of technologies, which at the time of the study were fashionable, under the circumstances of hyper-competition may have resulted in overestimating the disruptive nature of Internet computing. There is no way our study could remove the influence of such contextual bias. Therefore, some statements of the revolutionary nature of the changes may have weakened after the recent whims within the markets that deal with Internet computing. It is important to note, however, that we sought systematically to reduce such bias during interviews by including in our sample traditional companies that had developed software for over 40 years. Most companies in the sample had developed software in traditional ways for traditional platforms and most interviewees had extensive experience of such development. Therefore, during the interviews we purposefully contrasted the respondents' experience with Internet computing with their experiences with earlier computing platforms. We have visited these companies several times since the study and observed that their interpretation of the disruption has not changed (see Epilogue below).
Managerial Implications
Our findings have several managerial implications. Future IS research also needs to include more empirical investigations of macro-and micro-level processes that enable and drive architectural IT innovations, as well as their subsequent absorption and refinement. Future studies should also be extended to allow generalizations across a set of both pushing and pulling organizations of different adoption cohorts. Such future studies could help validate behavioral differences between adopting and non-adopting organizations on both the pull and the push sides of a disruptive IT innovation.
Last, this study examined only the first shock wave of a disruptive IT innovation, but did not trace its continued deployment. Future work should investigate how the innovative potential of a disruptive IT innovation is exhausted over time in adopting organizations and how it influences specific IT innovation sets. To this end, we plan to conduct a longitudinal study in the development organizations to observe the changing pace and tone of continued IT innovation. Disruptive innovations also raise the question of how adopting organizations adapt to disruptions. What we observed in organizations we studied was a frenetic and chaotic learning activity-which we call hyper-leamrning-while their adoption decisions were relatively fast and painless. The organi-zations had to learn quickly, deeply, and broadly to absorb Internet computing. Circumstances demanded that they ride two horses at onceboth technology exploration and exploitation. The critical role of knowledge and its volatility during disruptive periods should be investigated more carefully. Demands of knowledge exploitation seem to push governance structures on the one hand toward outsourced solutions because only specialized and innovative units can identify and absorb knowledge with adequate speeds, while on the other hand transforming internal structures of these organizations to highly organic forms.
Epilogue: Success in an Economy Gone Bad
The gloom in the global economy subsequent to the interviews has had only a limited impact on the firms participating in the study and shows the lasting impact of the adoption of Internet computing. Only two of the eight firms have gone out of business in spite of the economic recession that began in 2000, and neither of these two firms can be considered failed economic models. A larger competitor bought firm 4 to eliminate competition; its software products were purchased, and immediately phased out. The downturn in the economy did not eliminate this firm-its success did. Likewise, the parent of firm 5 went bankrupt even though the division included in the interview had been financially successful up until the parent company closed them down. There were specific concerns of both validity and reliability related to our research design, which justified the choice. Because of the fast change and ambiguity related to organizational exploration and exploitation of Internet computing, we felt it necessary to grasp actors' own understanding and experiences instead of using a structured questionnaire. We felt that this was particularly important in analyzing the radical nature of IT innovation, and how actors recognized dependencies between different innovation sets. We felt that the risk of missing critical information and thereby decreasing the internal validity of the findings due to poor construct validity was too high. Because we were focusing on disruptive behaviors-which by definition are broad and varied in forms-it would have been impractical to use survey based research. In addition, we felt that it is difficult to anticipate innovation forms across a set of organizations. We therefore saw value in gathering an open qualitative data set to understand what shapes the innovations were taking. Overall, the case study format enabled the use of multiple sources of evidence to improve construct validity (Yin 1994).
Entering into the field and collecting a rich data set enabled data to be understood in context and to be accounted for observed differences. This improved internal validity of the findings as it helped exclude alternative explanations (Yin 1994). The rich data also enabled process accounts to be developed for how the changes were being carried out and how the studied organizations responded over time to innovation.
B.2 Sampling and Data Collection
As noted, we followed a purposeful (theoretical) sampling strategy (Patton 1990 ) that increases the generalizability of results. It also serves the purpose of improving the external validity of findings by using a replication logic (literal replication) whereby the studied phenomena can be generalized into a theory of disruptive IT innovation (Yin 1994). Thereby, "ideal" types of organizations were sought out to be included in the sample of replicated "examples." These cases were to "be representative of a presumably large class of cases that fits with the requirements of a theory or theories to be tested" Markus (1989, p. 24). Sampling data within organizations that met these criteria achieved two important goals: it enabled new information about constructs of interest (like types of applications developed) to be obtained, and enhanced confidence in the measurement of the constructs through constant triangulation. By doing so we could aggressively use all strategies outlined by Patton (1990, pp. 182-183) to improve construct validity: criterion sampling (using interviewees and selecting questions based on predetermined criteria), theory based sampling (picking interviewees that were pertinent to constructs including radicalness and pervasive nature), chain sampling (checking that we went to right organizations), and opportunistic sampling (including data and interviewees as they emerged during the field work).
To minimize potential bias in our study we sought to maximize the variation in firm characteristics in our sample (characteristics of the firms sampled are shown in Table B .1). Therefore the sampled companies had different sizes and operated in various industry sectors ranging from manufacturing, financial services, public administration, to retail and transportation. The geographical scope of their operations varied largely as some were local software houses, while some were parts of large multinational companies. The companies also had large variation in their age in that their time of operations ranged from as few as four years to as many as 40+ years in software development.
We collected our data by carrying out data-intensive interviews in each company.24 Each interview lasted from one hour to three hours, and followed a semi-structured interview format shown in Appendix A. Most interviews were approximately two hours in length. The number of people participating in the interviews ranged from three to six and they were selected based on their knowledge and expertise in the area. The people had job titles like technical manager, technical expert, or business manager for the Web business. Most interviewed people had extensive experience from the field and made decisions about technology investments in studied companies, or were in charge of the strategic directions of the organization. They managed organizational knowledge bases and skills needed to execute a chosen technology and business strategy. When possible we tried always to include both managerial and technical experts into the interviews to remove the possible managerial "bias" when interviewing only the managers (Alvesson 1995) . This guaranteed that we obtained deep and rich insight into the technologies and the system development practices followed as the technical experts we interviewed were all the time fighting in the forefront of such problems. In two cases (firms 5 and 8) we had only one manager that participated in the interviews. Both firms also oversaw their development projects and were heavily involved in the technical aspects of systems development and in this sense the results of these interviews did not significantly differ from others. Overall, we felt we met the goals of criterion sampling, theory based sampling, and chain sampling. We applied a realist ontology (van Maanen 1988) and tried to find out what participants said or did rather than what we thought they meant. We also collected background information of personal career histories, and sought to obtain personal experiences and observations of changes. The data collection was driven by the theory based propositions outlined above and expressed in Appendix A. Additional notes were made during the visits concerning physical sites visited, personnel age, general atmosphere of the company, etc. We also collected written or published materials from these companies including their yearly reports, Web sites, advertising materials, manuals, or system handbooks to increase the quality of the data set.
241n four of the interviews (in Finland) we had two interviewers. 
